T HERE is an enigma about Unigenitus, the ill-fated bull issued by Pope Clement XI (1713) against the resurgence of Jansenism. If the Jansenist movement in general has continued to attract scholars, whose recent contributions are changing perspectives, 1 the constitution that condemned 101 "Jansenist propositions" extracted from the Réflexions morales was until recently left scrupulously untouched. It seemed taken for granted as an inevitable pivot-either a terminus ad quern, the logical conclusion of a century of theological and political disputes, or a terminus a quo, the origin of a movement of rebellion that eventually developed into a revolution.
culty of access to the some of the articles, 4 can therefore excuse a presentation that wishes to be more than a review, by combining Ceyssens' research and conclusions with those of others who have recently dealt with the same questions.
WHY

UNIGENITUS?
The renewal of the struggle against Jansenism at the end of the 17th century is generally ascribed to Louis XIV's desire for complete religious uniformity in his realm. A "Case of Conscience" submitted to the faculty of theology of Paris in 1701 made it clear that the "Peace of the Church" established by Clement IX in 1669 had allowed for the survival of a resistance to the previous condemnations of Jansenius, based on the now famous distinction between droit and fait, the right to condemn these propositions and their actual existence in Augustinus. In 1703 the confiscation of Pasquier Quesnel's documents and correspondence showed the existence of a network of "Augustinians" who were trying to influence religious life in Rome as well as in France.
5
For Ceyssens, these well-known facts are of major importance when they are analyzed in their original context; for, as he has repeatedly shown, Jansenism cannot be explained without its ideological opposition, anti-Jansenism, which predates it. 6 In this case the breach of peace must not simply be ascribed to the foolishness of some extreme Jansenists, but one must take into account the will of their opponents not only to destroy the heresy but to impose their own vision. As early as 1695, contrary to Innocent XII's clear admonitions, the fight had been renewed minimum that could be offered to the Jansenists." 13 But despite these difficulties a new condemnation was perceived as a way to strengthen a weak case and, more importantly, to serve as an indisputable affirmation of the final authority of the Roman pontiff.
The Cas de conscience was first condemned by a Roman brief (Cum nuper, Feb. 12,1703); its hurried redaction manifested both the desire of the papacy not to permit a resurgence of Jansenism, and an affirmation of authority. This intention was perceived in France; as Neveu notes, it accounts for the fact that the document was never made official there:
Such a measure, the precipitation of which indicated the importance attached to it by the Curia, was contrary both to episcopal and to parliamentary Gallicanism. Many bishops ... felt deprived of their immediate jurisdiction over the faithful and became, they thought, the apostolic vicars of a universal bishop. At the same time, the Sorbonne, glory of the University of Paris, mother of sciences, took its rank behind a handful of Roman consultore and judges. As for the members of Parliament, this pontifical intervention in the National Church, even though through an act devoid of the terms "ex certa scientia, et motu proprio," seemed inconsiderate, and more than vain. 14 This first failure was perceived in Rome as proof of the Jansenists' ability to resist condemnation by associating themselves with anti-Roman principles. 15 Henceforth the condemnation of Jansenism will be associated totally with the question of Gallican principles, 16 Rome will be more interested in being sollicited to assert her authority, "infallibility, the great dogma in dispute," 17 and the Jansenists will find natural allies in the defenders of the "Maxims of France." When Louis XIV asked for another papal document condemning the "obsequious silence" that would be formulated in compliance with Gallican terminology, he was requesting a tool to destroy the last Jansenist protection and give theological support to his will to homogenize French religious life. 18 
29
As he had already done with the earlier anti-Jansenist pronouncements, 30 Ceyssens, here in collaboration with J. A. G. Tans, has painstakingly reconstructed the elaboration process of the papal document. other evidence of this focusing on Quesnel's book, but it appears that the reíd attack started in Rome in 1702, when Guillaume Daubenton, S.J., the confessor of King Philip V of Spain, directed the pope's attention to the book. 33 Another step was taken in 1703, when the Capuchin Timothée de la Flèche presented the pontiff with a number of propositions he deemed heretical. 34 In 1705 the future confessor of Louis XIV affirmed in his Quesnel hérétique that the book contained more than 100 erroneous propositions.
35
All these elements must have been taken into account for the condemnation in July 1708 of the book by Universi dominici gregis, 36 but the first direct attack came in 1710 from the bishops of Luçon and La Rochelle, who noted 33 damnable propositions; 37 another list of 103 was sent in the summer of 1712 (probably by Le Tellier), then another 19-a total of 155 propositions that were to be examined. 38 Ceyssens judges the number "excessif et vain," since most of the problems they touched had already been dealt with. In this decision to delineate the errors that could be found in the Réflexions morales, contrary to a Roman tradition that ordinarily does not offer any justification for censuring a book, he sees the will to obtain a massive condemnation. is the Church that has the authority to excommunicate, so that she may exercise it through the chief pastors, with the consent, at least presumed, of the whole body," produced some hesitation. Even though it was considered "scandalosa, seditiosa, schismati favens, erronea," 54 the pope expressed his concern that its condemnation could provoke a Gallican rejection of the bull, but he eventually agreed to retain it. 55 Ceyssens strongly suggests that the final choice of the 101 propositions, the redaction of the papal document, and its technical "dressing" (habillement) were all the work of Cardinal Fabroni and his Jesuit adviser Daubenton. He quotes a confidence of Clement reported by Saint-Simon in his Mémoires 56 to support his interpretation that again, as in the case of the bull Cum occasione, the manoeuvres of an anti-Jansenist cardinal pushed (he even says "extorted from") the pope to go further in his condemnation than he originally wanted. 57 However, contrary to the memorialist's suggestions, he stresses that Clement reviewed the document and carefully revised its style before the official promulgation.
58
Despite the wise suggestions of Fénelon, 59 the 101 propositions were not individually condemned, but the different theological notes were given in globo, all together. This may appear as a strange decision: "What would we say of a judge who would condemn one hundred different culprits to being respectively burnt, quartered, impaled, scourged, imprisoned, and condemned to the galleys? The officer of justice who would have to deal with such a sentence would well be at a loss." 60 Yet this attitude must be understood as a plain desire to keep the condemnation at a general level, as was usual for Roman documents. This is why no direct references were given to the book itself, or allusions made to the context of the propositions. The Réflexions morales as a whole (in its 53 different editions) was condemned, and through the 101 propositions extracted from it, "Jansenism" in every conceivable form.
UNIGENITUS IN PARIS
The reception of the papal document in France was a perfect illustration of the strength and variety of Gallican principles. Because of the precautions and meticulous redaction, the bull was able to pass the first of the several tollgates raised by national traditions against papal encroachment. The text was cleared by the king's jurists for reception by the bishops and registration by Parliament. 61 In order to make the former easier, the king and his counselors opted for an extraordinary assembly of the bishops "present at court," under the chairmanship of the archbishop of Paris.
62 Despite his association with the censured book, Noailles had been able to maintain his status, since he had revoked his approbation as the Roman condemnation appeared inevitable. 63 joined by others. 74 The bull became a standing feature of French life; the crisis it provoked was to poison both religion and politics during the entire century.
THE CRISIS OF UNIGENITUS
It seems quite possible that, had history allowed for it, the survival of King Louis XIV would have secured the unanimous acceptance of Unigenitus. Noailles and the other opposing bishops would have been condemned and punished; anti-Jansenism would then have been victorious. But would Jansenism have disappeared?
The answer to this hypothetical question has to be negative. The bull represented more than a simple condemnation of theological errors; the fact that the crisis it produced erupted at such different levels shows that a conflict could not easily be avoided or even circumscribed. With their own nuances of interpretation, Ceyssens and Neveu concur in assessing the condemnation of Jansenism/Quesnelism as a way for Rome to resolve another and more crucial question, that of papal authority, against Gallican principles, in favor of the personal power of the Roman pontiff.
76
This goal was unrealistic, for it did not take into account Louis' faithfulness to a "Gallicanism" which he did not perceive as contradictory to his desire to see the eradication of Jansenism. 77 The bull consequently was flawed ab initio by an association of anti-Gallicanism with anti-Jansenism that was much more striking than the Jansenists' appeal to Gallican principles. 78 Instead of resolving in one single stroke a double opposition, one ecclesiological, the other methodological, 79 Clement by associating 74 Saint-Simon 551-52. 75 In the significant words of B. Neveu, "The monarch [had] engaged his kingdom and his dynasty in a blind alley from which they will only emerge to fall into revolution" (" them had provoked a "crystallization" 80 that hindered any sensible resolution.
The crisis of Unigenitus can be perceived at four different levels of interpretation, which sometimes overlap: it was a crisis of authority, a theological crisis, a political crisis, and a religious one. The last two elements have been rather satisfactorily surveyed. That the political aspect was important appears evident from the beginning. The fact that the bull was registered by Parliament in February 1714, then became law of state in March 1730, made opposition to it a political statement as well as a religious offense. 81 Conversely, the same association shows that religious conflicts were fought at a high political level, as is patent in the opposition to the Society of Jesus that eventually led to its suppression. 82 Similarly, three influences of the crisis cannot be denied: the growing anticlericalism, the strengthening of deism, and the negative attitude of the French Enlightenment toward religion. 83 However, these general observations will not be fully appreciated without reference to the central themes of the conflict: at its core the question remained theological, a complicated matter of authority and dogma. , 1983) Gallicanism, 87 or the spontaneous re-enactment of an earlier opposition to Rome provoked by Louis XIV against Innocent XL 88 It appears to have been the expression of a genuine dissatisfaction, even distress, with the role of the papacy and its inability to acknowledge the seriousness of the situation. For these men who were always accustomed to finding precedents in history, what the pope had been doing in the case of Quesnel's book was simply wrong, since the judgment he presented to the universal Church with the purpose of imposing it could be proven erroneous. 89 These manifest errors scandalized the French, not because of the question of infallibility, since they did not accept the notion, but for their deep ecclesiological meaning. The problem was not the pope's error but his refusal to acknowledge and repair it; for papal authority is for the edification of the Church, not its destruction. 90 If his text was not satisfactory, he should have simply reconsidered it and offered some corrections after being respectfully asked by the very bishops who (theoretically) solicited his intervention in the first place. To refuse to do so after it had become evident that the earlier judgment, far from fulfilling its purpose, was at least unclear, if not opposed to the tradition of the Church, was to place the personal interest of the pontiff before the Church's welfare, and to manifest an attitude of obstinado unbecoming to his responsibilities.
Unigenitus as a Crisis of Authority
The bishops' opposition to Unigenitus, and later their appeals to a general council, expressed therefore more than a general dissatisfaction or an appeal to public opinion. They manifested their desire to resolve a crisis which, after the pope's refusal to revise his document, could then be dealt with only at the level of the Catholic Church as a whole. Though it remained extremely abstract, and practically impossible since they represented a minority, this solution, if extreme, was a consistent one.
91
In other times a general council could well have decided to censure a pope who so evidently did not observe the traditions of the Church and seemed to change ecclesiastical structures by claiming a boundless authority. This attitude was clearly perceived in Rome, but though he now confided that he had been wrong to follow the extreme advices of Fabroni and Le Tellier, 93 Clement XI did not think it possible to disavow or even to "explain" his solemn document. Because of the claims of the papacy to ultimate authority and personal infallibility, he was condemned to forge ahead, with the hope that a successor would be better able to control the situation. 94 In 1718 a new bull, Pastoralis officii, "too apologetic to be effective," 95 expressed the papal stalemate, affirming his authority against a minority that "fears that [Unigenitus] destroys Catholic dogmas [ ... ] which would be the same as to fear that Peter's faith should have failed and that the whole Church of Jesus Christ had strayed from the way of truth and salvation." 96 Short of excommunicating his detractors, the pope "excluded them from his communion."
97
The "crystallization" provoked by Unigenitus was first an opposition between two models of the Church, Gallican and ultramontane. For the ultramontanes, the case was finished when the supreme pastor had decided, whereas for the Gallicans, only "reception" by the local Church could assure the authority of the pontifical document. An outline of this particular conception will help to understand the difficulties fully.
For Gallican theorists, even Fénelon, as has been seen above, the magisterium of the Roman pontiff is always exercised in conjunction with the bishops. The problem of Jansenism, with the necessity it created to invoke the solemn authority of the pope, had forced the French to consider a precise pattern of reception of the papal pronouncements that would maintain that premise. It was essentially devised by Pierre de Marca, the archbishop of Toulouse, and based itself on the historical precedents of the African Church.
98 This is how it was conceived: the local Church raises a question (and proceeds to a first condemnation), then requests Rome to study the same question (and sanction their decision); the solemn conclusion of the papacy is verified (and compared with the local censure) and officially approved by provincial councils. It is only with this last step that it receives its "catholic" or universal 
value."
According to these principles, therefore, the fact that Unigenitus had not received unanimous episcopal approbation did not qualify the document to be presented as an official teaching of the Catholic Church. What was needed in this situation was nothing but "conciliar unanimity":
Whether one stops with France or looks at the other national churches, everywhere the constitution is considered a mere judgment by the pope. Nowhere does one see the unanimous and canonical consent that alone can confer on the judgments of the supreme pontiff the grades of authority and strength that are needed to transform them into laws of the Church
The question is whether the bull Unigenitus that condemns 101 propositions on matters important to religion is consistent with the doctrine and the tradition of the Church. The natural way to make sure of it is first to fix the common sense (sens populaire) of each of these propositions, then to compare them with Scripture and tradition. This is the way councils have always proceeded.
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Unigenitus as a Theological Crisis
If the opposition consolidated by Unigenitus clearly dealt with questions of authority in the Church, it appears evident that the core of the matter remained essentially theological.
101 Even more than the process of its elaboration and reception, it was the content of the papal document that caused problems. What was seen in Rome as "false, captious, pernicious [ ... ] and finally heretical" was perceived in France as authentically Catholic. The question of authority-who defines the Catholic truth, the pope alone or the bishops with the pope-became compounded with another: How does the Church assure herself of this truth? In this context the pope's claim to ultimate authority and infallibility was perceived by the Gallicans as the basis for a dangerous "evolution of dogma" that actually changed, and therefore betrayed, Catholic faith. The polarization of issues-Molinist-ultramontane vs. Jansenist-Gallican-supported this interpretation, but it was the contents of the bull that made the conclusion inevitable.
equal to the Scriptures. 109 The positive method used in the Gallican Church, the attraction of the early Christian centuries, the experience of religious controversy, all supported a theological construction that considered the origins of Christianity as the only acceptable reference point. 110 The Roman conception, on the other hand, with its stress on the authority of the papacy, declared the official pronouncements the last words on the matter, since they represented the living tradition. 279 constitution a conflict was in existence, but it was fought within the theoretical context of the "freedom of schools" at the level of specialists; the papacy was not directly involved. 114 The promulgation of Vineam Domini, then of Unigenitus, changed the debate because, despite their cautious redaction, 115 the two bulls clearly associated the office of the pope with extreme anti-Jansenism, as well as ultramontanism. Here the evidence offered by Ceyssens must be accepted: Cardinal Fabroni and his Jesuit associates went too far and exerted a regrettable influence over a less extreme pontiff. Similarly, Ceyssens' insistence on a parallel between the early condemnations of Jansenism and the elaboration of Unigenitus must be appreciated; if the similarity strikes such a specialist, we may understand why the opponents of the constitution had noted it too. Familiar with the history of the first condemnations, 116 they were aware of the pressure exerted by the French Court and by some influential clerics to obtain a Roman condemnation of Quesnel's book. They themselves had a good experience of Roman politics, 117 and through their connections in the Eternal City had followed the details of the preparation of the new document.
118 They judged the condemnation an evident abuse of the office of the papacy. Ceyssens adopts their conclusions entirely. 119 In defending the Jansenist interpretation of the origins of the bull, Ceyssens does not approve their errors; he simply points to the real issues. Unigenitus was unrealistic because, in its desire to destroy the root itself of Jansenism and at the same time prove the ultimate authority of the pope, it challenged the entire theological methodology of the Gallicans as well as their ecclesiology. The question had been in the background since the condemnation of Augustinus, but in this case no distinction, no alternative was imaginable. To many the situation furnished a very clear proof not only of the validity but of the necessity of the Gallican model of the Church, which would protect the papacy, the sedes, against the errors of-or, to be more respectful, the bad influence over-the pope, the sedens. The debate then became harsher because what was at stake appeared clearer, a different conception of Catholicism: not only the ecclesiological articulation of the papacy and the episcopate, but a much larger theological construction, with all its social and political ramifications. To the association, at least perceived as such, of Molinism and ultramontanism, a Jansenist-Gallican coalition had to offer resistance. It already was in the making and even existed in some instances, as certainly in the Réflexions morales, but it acquired a new strength after the promulgation of the constitution and Rome's refusal to consider any modification.
When the bull arrived in France, the staunch Gallicans then associated with the Jansenists in some of the condemnations resisted for theological reasons. The conclusion they reached on "essential truths" was different, if not exactly opposite. 120 They considered that they not only had the right but the duty to do so. Exception to their attitude was taken by the king, who, not conversant with these matters, wanted a total conformity. He thus associated his political power not only with the defense of papal authority but with a theological system that was different in its method and conclusions from the Gallican one he had inspired. The polarization was then completed: Molinist + ultramontane + royal. To blame the Jansenists for their "mentality of opposition" is to forget that they were forced into a resistance that because of the monarch's attitude had to be political as well as theological.
The process continued to escalate after the death of Louis XIV (1715)-inevitably, since Rome refused any explanatory modification. During the first years of the new reign, both the bishops opposed to and those in favor of the constitution tried again to reach a solution by agreeing upon a common interpretation of the papal document, but they were unable to obtain Roman support. 121 In this dramatic confrontation with the papacy 122 Gallican principles were seriously shaken and probably 120 The major theological divergences are developed at length in the ponderous quantity of books and pamphlets published during the period; cf. J. Carreyre, "Unigenitus," DTC 15, 2157-62. Noailles's Instruction pastorale, published in February 1714, points to those issues: "the difference between the two covenants, the grace of Jesus Christ, the characteristics of faith, the nature of the Church, the love of God, the fear of punishment, the rules for administration of penance, excommunication, the reading of Scripture, persecutions and suffering, i.e. the major points of doctrine, discipline, and Christian morality" (Accommodements 360). For that matter, one should take seriously contemporaneous judgments claiming that the ill-fated bull was "one of the major events since the apostles' time." 124 For those who were involved in it, in France, Rome, and elsewhere, the crisis must indeed have been experienced as a great challenge to Catholic identity. 125 Unigenitus did not create what could be termed "Catholic resistance to Rome" (instances of a similar attitude can be found throughout the 17th century 126 ), but the long struggle "about the bull" certainly gave it greater consistency.
Historians generally consider that, properly speaking, the crisis of Unigenitus stretched from the bull's reception in France (1714) to the registration as a law of state by Parliament (1730). 127 By that date what the crisis had produced was clear enough. First, it offered a precise object to what before had been only a sporadic or episodic reaction. Unigenitus now typified the autocratic attitude of the Romans; its rejection had become an appeal to an ideal conception of authority in the Church. Second, it provided an agenda of reforms; the very pastoral attitudes censured by the constitution could not be abandoned but had to be carried out nevertheless. Third, it exacerbated the differences between schools or "parties" in the Catholic Church. Despite the slow and ambiguous emergence of a "Third Party," 128 Catholicism was to be weakened by the nonresolution of the crisis, and the Church's ability to answer more serious challenges atrophied considerably. 
